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Ball and Moffitt (2001) present a theory implying that the gap between productivity 
and wage aspirations can shift the traditional Phillips Curve. We examine their theory 
within the OECD. The results show that there is no clear cross country evidence for 
the theory. Although Ball and Moffitt’s model works well in the U.S., it cannot, in 
general, be applied to other OECD countries. The time- varying NAIRU can better 
explain the economic performance for the OECD overall, and the UK in particular, 
during the late 1990s. In Germany, traditional Phillips Curve still kept its explanatory 
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 Productivity Growth and Inflation: A Multi-Country Study 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
   The double decline of inflation and unemployment in U.S. at the end of 1990s has 
received a good deal of attention. Ball and Moffitt (2001) present a model to explain the 
favourable shift of the Phillips Curve by acceleration in productivity relative to wage 
claims. They point out that productivity grew faster than wage aspirations in the US 
during this period, so that the positive gap between productivity and aspirations 
generated deflationary pressure even as the unemployment rate was low. It has been 
also argued that the same process (with productivity lagging behind of wage 
aspirations) could explain the stagflation of the 1970s (see Grubb, et al. 1982).  
   Looking at the whole of the OECD, inflation and unemployment have exhibited a 
pattern similar to that of the U.S. As shown in Figure 1, both inflation and 
unemployment declined in the late 1990s in the OECD. The purpose of this paper is to 
ask whether this productivity explanation is robust for the US and, if so, whether it is 
also applicable to other OECD countries.  
To study productivity in the OECD, we use panel data methods to estimate the 
Phillips Curve model with a new variable – the gap between productivity and wage 
aspirations (the “productivity gap”). The data for productivity and wage aspirations are 
constructed according to Ball and Moffitt (2001). If the addition of this new variable 
 2improves the fit of the Phillips Curve during the late 1990s, we can say Ball and Moffitt 
(2001) can be generally applied to forecast inflation in OECD countries. However, 
there are other plausible explanations of the behaviour of inflation and unemployment 
in the late 1990s: positive supply shocks (Gordon, 1998; Lown and Rich, 1997) and a 
fall in the NAIRU (Gordon, 1997). We consider these possible alternative explanations 
for the behaviour of inflation and unemployment in the OECD. 
In addition to the OECD overall, we study three single countries – the U.S, the 
UK and Germany. The reason is that, these countries had different productivity growth 
rates at the end of 1990s. Germany and the UK even experienced productivity 
slowdown. This provides the opportunity to investigate the effect of productivity gap 
in different situations.  
   The structure of this paper is as follows: after we introduce the data and 
methodology in section two, we investigate the failings of the traditional Phillips 
Curve in section three. The traditional Phillips Curve has systematically over-predicted 
inflation since 1996. In section four, we add the Ball and Moffitt (2001) productivity 
gap to the traditional model. Except for the US, this does not improve the fit over the 
traditional model. We then check the robustness of the role of productivity gap in the 
Phillips Curve by adding supply shock variable and the effect of time-varying NAIRU 
in sections five and six respectively. With these additional variables, productivity gap 
model always predicts inflation more precisely in the U.S, but this is not true in the 
OECD. The addition of the other variables makes the productivity gap model generate 
worse forecast results in the UK and Germany. Section seven concludes.  
 3 
2.  Data and Methodology 
 
   This paper is limited to the OECD member countries. Annual data for 19 OECD 
countries over 1961 – 2000 is available.
2 We will estimate models over 1961 – 1995, 
then use the estimates to forecast inflation for the rest of years. Most of the data used in 
this paper come from OECD Economic Outlook (2000). Detailed information about 
definition of the variables is given in Table 1. The inflation data is derived from 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), whose source is International Financial Statistics (2000). 
Productivity growth and wage aspirations are constructed on the base of raw data 
according to the method in Ball and Moffitt (2001). Data for the OECD as whole is just 
the average values for 19 member countries.
3  
In Ball and Moffitt (2001), output per hour data is used to construct productivity 
growth. However, this data is not available for all OECD countries. We use output per 
worker instead. This variable does not measure productivity perfectly because it 
contains the cyclical factors. In particular, it varies cyclically following the movement 
of workers effort. To rule out the cyclical effect of workers effort, we copy Ball and 
Moffitt’s method, which suggests regressing the change of output per worker on the 
change of weekly hours for each country. The theoretical justification for doing this is 
that effort moves proportionately with average weekly hours of employed workers 
over the business cycle. Then we use the residuals from this regression to measure true 
                                                        
2Countries dropped due to missing data are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, 
Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia and Turkey,  
3 The average values for 19 member countries are unweighted by country size, because some small 
countries would be almost ignored if we take country size into account (see Grubb,1986).  
 4productivity growth, adding a constant to make the mean of productivity growth equal 
to the mean of the change of output per worker. The constructed result is shown in 
figure 2.
4   
Wage aspirations are constructed from real wage data. Again, following Ball and 
Moffitt (2001), we assume current wage aspirations growth is a function of last year’s 
wage aspirations growth and last year’s real wage growth: 
                     1 1 ) )( 1 ( − − − − + = t t t w A A π µ µ                        (1) 
where A is wage aspirations growth, π − w   is real wage growth and 1 0 ≤ ≤ µ . Iterating 
equation (1) implies that current wage aspirations growth is related to the real wage 
growth back to the infinite past. But due to the limitation of our sample size, we simply 
assume the earliest available trend real wage growth is equal to that year’s wage 
aspirations growth.
5 The following years’ wage aspirations growth is calculated from 
the previous year’s level according to equation (1) following Ball & Moffitt (2001). 
The coefficient  µ  in wage aspirations definition is set to 0.95 so as to reflect the 
characteristic that wage aspirations not only capture the important changes of real 
wage, but also move along a relatively smooth path.
6 The constructed wage aspirations 
                                                        
4 This data is available upon request. 
5 The trend real wage growth of each individual country in the base year is measured by the Hodrick – 
Prescott filter over the whole sample for that country with smoothing parameter 1000. 
6 We impose µ = 0.95 following Ball and Moffitt (2001). The reason is that the estimatedµs are 
imprecise, which is reflected by the wide standard error bands around the estimated values. According to 
Ball and Moffitt (2001), we include the new variable - productivity gap ( A − θ ) into the traditional 
Phillips Curve model, then jointly estimate µ with other coefficients by nonlinear least square. The 
estimatedµs and the associated standard errors are OECD: 0.772(1.063), US: 0.427(0.736), UK: 
0.855(0.304), Germany: 0.259(2.652). Furthermore, F test results show that the estimated  µ values  and 
the imposed value 0.95 are not significantly different. The p values of the F test for the hypothesis that 
the estimated  µ equals 0.95 are: OECD: 0.868, US: 0.483, UK: 0.754 and Germany: 0.796.   
 5are shown in Figure 3.  
We estimate four specifications of the Phillips Curve for the whole OECD and 
three single countries – the U.S., the UK and Germany. We first estimate the traditional 
Phillips Curve model and use the estimates to forecast inflation. Then we add 
productivity gap to the model and investigate if the extension increases the precision of 
inflation forecast.
7 Finally, in order to test the robustness of the productivity model, we 
examine the role of productivity and wage aspirations in a supply shock model and a 
time – varying potential output model (we use time-varying potential output model to 
capture the effect of time-varying NAIRU due to the convenience of potential output 
data). The reason of choosing supply shock and potential output model is that both 
supply shock and time – varying NAIRU are considered by many as the credible 
explanations for the double decline of inflation and the unemployment rate in the U.S. 
(Gordon, 1997; Lown and Rich, 1997). Therefore, two additional models are estimated 
where one model includes supply shock and productivity gap, while the other model 
includes time-varying potential output and productivity gap. The relative importance 
of productivity gap should be shown clearly by doing this. In the course of analysing 
each specification, we will not only provide the panel result for the whole OECD, but 
also the results for the three single countries (US, UK and Germany).  
3. The Traditional Phillips Curve 
The traditional price inflation Phillips Curve is specified as￿ 
                                                        
7 The Phillips Curve specifications we compared in this paper are similar to those in Gruen, Pagan and 
Thompson (1999). 
 6*) )( ( ) ( 1 U U L L t t t − + = − β π α π                    (2) 
Where  t π  is the rate of inflation,  1 − t π  is lagged inflation representing the adaptive 
inflation expectation, u is the unemployment rate, u* is the NAIRU, u-u* is the 
unemployment gap indicating the excess demand stimulating inflation and ) (L α and 
) (L β  are polynomials in the lag operator. Usually several lags for inflation and 
unemployment are included in order to capture the inertia in the adjustment of 
expectation and unemployment. If the NAIRU is assumed to be constant, u∗ can be 
treated as the parameter, and (2) may be re-written as              
                      t t t t U L L C ε β π α π + + + = − ) ( ) ( 1                   (3) 
where  * ) ( U L C β − =  and  t ε  represents the random shocks to inflation.  
To estimate the Phillips Curve, we need to impose the restriction on equation (3) 
that the sum of coefficients of lagged inflation is unity. The reason is that the NAIRU 
exists only in the condition of this restriction, i.e. the NAIRU is equal to the 
unemployment rate when inflation is stable. So we replace inflation of (3) by the first 
difference of inflation then get: 
                      t t t t U L L C ε β π α π + + ∆ + = ∆ − ) ( ) ( 1                      (4)
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Where  * ) 1 ( U C β − =  
    We use the data and methods mentioned previously to estimate (4) for the OECD 
overall and separately for the US, the UK and Germany over the period 1961 - 1995. 
                                                        
8 Coefficient  ) (L α in equation (4) is related to ) (L α in equation (3) by the relationship that 
∑ = ) ( ) ( L L α α  
 7Following Grub (1986), we take two lags of each variable in the regressions to 
maximize adjusted 
2 R . 
Table 2 shows the estimation results from the traditional Phillips Curve model. 
Each estimator in the table shows the sum of coefficients on that variable. The statistic 
in parentheses is the p-value from a F-test of the hypothesis that sum of coefficients on 
the variable is zero. The sums of coefficients on the lagged change of inflation are 
highly significant in OECD but insignificant in all the single countries. This means that 
inflation expectation adjusts more quickly in the three example countries than in the 
OECD.  
In each regression, the unemployment rate has the expected negative sign. The 
p-values are particularly high for the UK and Germany, which raises the possibility 
that unemployment has no effect on inflation. Using the coefficients, we can calculate 
the sacrifice ratio ( ) for these countries. The sacrifice ratio in the U.S. is 
2.06, which implies that the unemployment rate would have to go up by 2.06 
percentage point in order for inflation to fall by one percentage point. Those of the 
OECD, UK and Germany are 11.67, 4.12 and 14.08 respectively. The sacrifice ratio in 
the OECD and Germany is very high, which relates to a low coefficient on the rate of 
unemployment. In the OECD, there are two types of estimation bias could explain this. 
First, some variables do affect inflation, but they are omitted from the traditional 
Phillips Curve. This may also cause the high sacrifice ratio in Germany. Second, in the 
pooled OLS regression, there is only one constant, the NAIRU cannot vary across 
countries. In fact, the NAIRU could be different in each country. So it could be this 
∑ ) ( / 1 L B
 8unreasonable restriction that leads to a bias. If we look at the within model, where the 
constant differs over countries, the sacrifice ratio for OECD falls to 4.9. For this reason, 
we’ll use the within result to forecast inflation for the OECD. 
    To test the usefulness of this Phillips Curve specification, we construct an 
out-of-sample forecast of inflation. We use the coefficients estimated from Equation (4) 
to generate the dynamic inflation forecast results for the period 1996-2000. The 
difference between the true value and predicted value illustrates the accuracy of the 
model. As shown in Figure 4, the Phillips Curve of equation (4) has clearly and 
systematically over-predicted inflation within the OECD. We also report the mean of 
forecast error and the standard deviation of predicted inflation in Table 2. The positive 
sign on the mean of the forecast error shown in Table 2 implies that the over-prediction 
from the traditional Phillips Curve is systematic in the OECD. This can also be seen 
from Figure 4. For the OECD overall, the predicted value of inflation remains above 
the actual inflation all the time. These two standard error bands mean that the actual 
inflation rate could be anywhere between the two bands within a 95 per cent 
confidence interval. The wide standard error bands imply an amount of uncertainty 
about forecast result from the traditional Phillips Curve model. In any year, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that forecasted inflation equals actual inflation.  
In the U.S. and the UK, the over-prediction of traditional Phillips Curve is more 
obvious than in the OECD. None of the predicted values is under actual inflation. The 
forecast error in both countries is considerable. However, Germany is an exception. 
Inflation is predicted precisely most of the time in late 1990s. Standard deviation of the 
 9forecast result is the smallest among all the countries. The standard model explains 
Germany well. 
 
4. The Phillips Curve with Productivity Gap 
Workers’ wage aspirations may adjust slowly to the unexpected productivity growth. 
Any temporary gap between productivity and wage aspirations could disturb the 
traditional relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate. In this section, we 
add productivity gap to the conventional Phillips Curve model and investigate how it 
shifts the inflation – unemployment relation. This new variable is treated as a “supply 
shock” following Ball and Moffitt (2001). This means that, given the NAIRU, the 
unemployment rate can stay at low without raising inflation when productivity 
accelerates so that the gap between productivity and aspirations is above zero.  
    The modified Phillips Curve specification is: 
               t t t t t A L U L L C ε θ γ β π α π + − + + ∆ + = ∆ − ) )( ( ) ( ) ( 1                    (5)                
where * ) 1 ( U C β − =  and  A − θ  is the gap between productivity ( θ ) and wage 
aspirations (A). Table 3 shows the estimated parameters from equation (5). The 
coefficient on productivity gap is negative for all the countries. This implies a rise in 
productivity growth relative to wage aspirations has a negative effect on inflation. 
However, this effect is insignificant in all the countries.
9 We cannot reject the hypothesis 
                                                        
9 The US result is different with that of Ball and Moffitt (2001) where they show  A − θ has significant 
effect on inflation. The reason is that we include two lagged terms for A − θ , whereas Ball and Moffitt 
included only the current A − θ in the Phillips Curve model. In other words, the US result presented in 
Table 3 shows the accumulated effect of  A − θ  on inflation, but Ball and Moffitt (2001) implies that 
the immediate effect of  A − θ  is significant.  Our dynamic analysis of  A − θ  is shown in Table 4, 
 10that the sum of the coefficient on productivity gap is zero at any significant level. This 
indicates that the productivity gap has no effect on inflation in the long run. To explore 
more information about the effect of the productivity gap, we investigate the individual 
coefficients of this variable. The detailed estimated coefficient on productivity gap is 
presented in Table 4. 
Seen from Table 4, productivity gap has immediate and negative effect on inflation 
significantly in the OECD and the UK but no significant effect in the US and Germany. 
The effect lasts for more than one year in both countries, which implies that wage 
aspirations adjust quickly in the OECD and the UK following the fluctuations of 
productivity growth. 
In Table 3, the coefficient on lagged change of inflation is similar to those in the 
traditional model for all the countries. Through a F-test,
10 we know the coefficient on 
this variable is not significantly different across the models. This implies that our 
estimation of the inflation expectation adjustment process is robust to the inclusion of 
other variables in the model. 
All the coefficients on the unemployment rates get the expected negative signs. 
Compared with the previous model, coefficients (absolute value) on the unemployment 
                                                                                                                                                               
which is also different with the result of Ball and Moffitt (2001) due to the different model 
specifications. 
10The null hypothesis is that the sum of coefficient on lagged change of inflation in the productivity 
model is equal to that in the traditional model. The test P-value is: OECD: 0. 384; U.S: 0.808; UK: 0.17; 
Germany: 0.741. Under the null hypothesis, we estimate the traditional model and take the sum of 
coefficient on lagged change of inflation, then estimate productivity model and test the hypothesis that 
the sum of coefficient on lagged change of inflation equal to the former value.  
 11rate slightly fall but are statistically equal in all the countries.
 11 Therefore, adding the 
productivity gap, the Phillips Curve relation between inflation and the unemployment 
rate keeps relatively stable. The sacrifice ratio in this model is 5.07 per cent in the 
OECD, 2.57 per cent in the U.S, 5.3 per cent in the UK and 161.29 per cent in 
Germany. However, 161.29 per cent is unreliable both because its incredible size and 
because it results from an estimate that is insignificantly different from zero. 
Furthermore, the NAIRU derived from the productivity model is higher than before 
due to the slight fall of the coefficient of unemployment rate. It seems incredible that 
the UK and Germany have the NAIRU of 25.4 per cent and 16.1 per cent respectively 
compared with their average unemployment rate 6.89 per cent and 8.92 per cent. All of 
these imply that the inclusion of the productivity gap does not improve the ability of 
Phillips Curve to model the UK and Germany experience. 
The inflation forecast results from the productivity model are shown in Figure 5. 
With the productivity gap, the Phillips Curve model over predicts inflation again in the 
OECD. All the predicted values are above the actual ones. Both the forecast error and 
standard deviation, which average to 1.09 per cent and 1.33 per cent respectively, are 
higher than those from the traditional model. In the U.S, productivity gap reduces a part 
of over-prediction of inflation from the traditional model. But the standard deviation is 
approximately equal to that of the previous model. In the UK and Germany, the inflation 
forecasts from the new model are worse than the traditional model. The mean of the 
                                                        
11 The hypothesis that the coefficients on the unemployment rate are the same as that in the previous 
model can not be rejected at the conventional significant levels for all the individual countries. The 
P-value for this F-test is: OECD: 0.915, U.S.: 0.673, UK: 0.888 and Germany: 0.646. 
 
 12forecast error is bigger. The standard deviation of the forecast values is higher. Therefore, 
we need to examine the role of productivity gap further.  
 
5. Supply Shock and Productivity Gap 
 
Supply shock variables are usually included in the estimated Phillips Curve 
models, because supply shocks create an extraneous positive correlation between 
inflation and unemployment. This also is the reason why supply shocks were used to 
explain the double decline of inflation and unemployment in the late 1990s for the U.S. 
(Gordon, 1998). In this section, we put productivity gap and the supply shock together 
and check the significance of productivity gap in the Phillips Curve model. We use 
import price to measure supply shock. It picks up the effect of a change in the value of 
local currency, as well as changes in the international prices of commodities. In the 
estimated model, we use the first difference of the variables to represent the supply 
shock. This captures the notion that a shock is the difference between the actual value 
of a variable and the value that was anticipated when agents make the economic 
decisions that determined the NAIRU (i.e. we assume expectations are based on a 
random walk).  Our supply shock model with productivity gap is given by equation 
(6) 
       t t t t t t importp L A L U L L C ε δ θ γ β π α π + ∆ + − + + ∆ + = ∆ − ) ( ) )( ( ) ( ) ( 1      (6) 
where  * ) 1 ( U C β − = .  
Table 5 presents the estimation results from supply shock model with and without 
 13the productivity gap added. The effect of productivity gap is still insignificant in all the 
circumstance where other supply shock variable is included. The estimated coefficients 
are all associated with a very high P-value, which implies that   productivity gap has 
no effect on inflation in the long run.  
Compared with the uncertainty of the effect of productivity gap across different 
models, the import price has stable effect on inflation. With or without productivity gap, 
an increase in the import price always raises inflation in all the countries except 
Germany where it is highly significant. The effect is especially significant in the OECD 
and the US. 
Finally, the coefficients on unemployment and on lagged changed inflation are 
virtually unchanged across two supply shock models in the OECD and the U.S. This 
implies that the inflation and unemployment relation is quite stable across different 
models in both countries. However, this relation is not so stable in the UK and 
Germany where productivity gap and supply shocks interacted with the coefficients on 
lagged inflation and unemployment. This suggests that the productivity gap model is 
less robust to misspecification in the case of the UK and Germany than in the case of 
the US.  
Figure 6 provides the inflation forecast results from the supply shock model with and 
without productivity gap, together with the actual inflation rate. Including productivity 
gap does not make the supply shock model forecast inflation more precisely in the 
OECD. From figure 6, we can see that, for the OECD overall, the predicted inflation 
generated by the supply shock model with productivity gap is further from actual 
 14inflation than those produced without productivity gap. The forecast result in the U.S. 
has different implications. Adding productivity gap pushes the predicted inflation close 
to the actual value. Furthermore, the model with all the variables provides the most 
precise forecast inflation, compared with other models, which indicates productivity gap 
does explain a moderate part of performance of inflation and unemployment in the 
1990s of the U.S.
12 In the UK, the supply shock model with or without productivity gap 
still over predicts inflation in late 1990s. In Germany, the supply shock model without 
productivity gap gives the most precise forecast result. However, this improvement is 
slight, as traditional model does not over predict inflation by much.  
 
6. Time-Varying NAIRU and Productivity Gap 
 
Up to now, all the models we analyzed are based on an assumption that the NAIRU is 
a constant through time. However, the NAIRU could be time varying. Gordon (1997) 
argues that the fall in the NAIRU allowed unemployment to stay low in the late 1990s 
without the danger of rising inflation. In order to check the robustness of the effect of 
productivity gap, we incorporate the time-varying NAIRU into the productivity Phillips 
Curve model. But we are not going to estimate the NAIRU in this section, instead, we 
use time – varying potential output to replace the time – varying NAIRU in the Phillips 
Curve model. In other words, we estimate a Phillips Curve relation between inflation 
                                                        
12 Also, supply shock may play a role during the same period in the U.S. 
 15and output. The potential output data is available in OECD database. The variation of 
potential output should illustrate the same characteristics as the time-varying NAIRU.  
The potential output Phillips Curve with productivity is: 
            t t t t t A L outputgap L L ε ϑ γ β π α π + − + + ∆ = ∆ − ) )( ( ) ( ) ( 1             (7) 
where output gap = actual output – potential output. 
We estimate two potential output models in this section, one model with productivity 
gap such as (7), the other one without. Table 6 gives the estimation results for both 
models. Similar to the previous model, an insignificant coefficient on productivity gap is 
shown clearly in all the countries. The hypothesis test result shows that it is not 
significantly different from that of the productivity model of section three.
13 The output 
gap has positive coefficients in all the countries, which indicates that a positive output 
gap generates the inflationary pressure. This effect is significant in the OECD, the U.S. 
and Germany and quite stable across both output models.
14 Lagged change of inflation 
has the similar effect on inflation in both models in all the countries.  
Figure 7 shows actual inflation and predicted inflation from two potential output 
models, one with productivity gap, and one without. Considering time – varying 
potential output and productivity gap together, productivity gap appears less important. 
From the figure, we see that, adding output gap makes the model forecast inflation 
                                                        
13 P-value of F test of the hypothesis that coefficient on  A − θ equals that in the productivity model is: 
OECD:0. 251, US: 0.683, UK: 0.983, Germany:0. 268. 
14 Hypothesis that the coefficient on output gap is same in the output model with and without 
A − θ cannot be rejected at any significant level for all the countries. P value of the test is: OECD: 
0.933, US: 0.918, UK: 0.816 and Germany: 0.777.  
 16more precisely than all the previous models in the OECD. Although the inclusion of 
productivity gap in the output gap model generates predicted inflation closer to the 
actual values, this improvement is smaller than that from including the time-varying 
output gap. In the U.S, the effect of productivity gap on inflation is to generate a more 
precise forecast result. Therefore, the acceleration of productivity growth in the late 
1990s could explain the decline of inflation and the unemployment rate in the U.S. i.e. 
as suggested by Ball and Moffitt (2001). In the UK, adding the productivity gap 
actually reduces the quality of the forecast from the potential output model. In 
Germany, the model with the productivity gap cannot forecast inflation any better than 




This paper set out to examine a productivity theory presented by Ball and Moffitt 
(2001) within the OECD countries. That theory implies that workers’ wage aspirations 
adjust slowly to the unexpected productivity growth. Any temporary gap between 
productivity and wage aspirations would disturb the traditional relationship between 
inflation and the unemployment rate. Following Ball and Moffitt (2001), we include the 
new variable – the gap between productivity and wage aspirations -- into the traditional 
Phillips Curve model. Then the new model is applied to the OECD as a whole and to 
three countries individually (US, UK and Germany). 
Our results confirm the role of the gap between productivity and wage aspirations in 
 17the double decline of inflation and unemployment in the U.S., which was the focus of 
Ball and Moffitt (2001). We showed that this result was robust to specification changes: 
specifically we found that the productivity gap was an important aspect to US 
disinflation even when we allow for other supply shocks and a time-varying NAIRU. 
In contrast, the role of productivity gap is not robust across countries. Our results 
suggest that the positive gap between productivity and wage aspirations was not an 
important aspect of the deflation within the OECD during the 1990s. On the contrary, the 
time – varying NAIRU explains most of the economic performance across the OECD in 
the late 1990s. This implies that there have been some positive structural changes in the 
labour market within the OECD since 1990s.  
In addition Ball and Moffitt (2001) result does not extend to two major OECD 
countries. In the UK, the change of the structure of the labour market (resulting in the 
change of the NAIRU) seemed the key; and in Germany, traditional Phillips Curve 
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) log( 1 − − = t t CPI CPI Inflation      CPI: consumer price index (IFS) 
The unemployment rate = (LF – ET)/LF  LF: labour force; ET: total employed (EO)
Change of import price 
=   ) log( ) log( 1 − − t t PMG PMG
PMG: import price goods, local currency, 
custom basis l (EO) 
Output gap = GDPV/GDPVIR – 1  GDPV: gross domestic product, volume 
GDPVIR: potential gross domestic produc
(EO) 
Output per worker = (GDPV/ET)/ GDPV 
(overall base year)/ET(overall base year) 
GDPV, GDPVIR and ET same as above 
(EO) 
Real wage = WRMAN / PGDP 
 
 
WRMAN: wage rate, manufacturing 
PGDP: deflator for GDP at market 
deflator(EO) 
Weekly work hours = (average actual annu
hours worked per person in employment) / 












Traditional Phillips Curve Model 
(1961-1995) 
(Dependent Variable:  π ∆ ) 
              
   CD   US          Germany 
 20OE UK 
   Pooled Within        
             
Constant    0.006 0.012  0.031  0.018    0.005 
   (0.001)*    (0.030) (0.115)    (0.108) 
             
Lagged change of Inflation -0.278 -0.318  -0.090  -0.371  0.256 
   (0.000) (0.000)  (0.716)  (0.184)  (0.260) 
             
Unemployment -0.086  -0.204 -0.485  -0.243    -0.071 
   (0.000) (0.000)  (0.031)  (0.155)  (0.283) 
             
Sacrifice Ratio**    11.67  4.90  2.18  4.12       14.08 
             
NAIRU*    0.070  0.059 0.064  0.074    0.070 
             
Forecast Error    0.633  3.25  3.18    -1.24 
(%)            
Standard Deviation    1.42  1.45  3.09    1.06 
(%)            
    
Adjusted 
2 R   0.088 0.083  0.492  0.244    0.359 
*The number in parentheses is p value of F-test for the hypothesis that the sum of coefficients of a 
variable is zero.  
*The NAIRU is calculated from the constant above, since it is assumed that  * ) 1 ( U C β − =  










Productivity Phillips Curve Model  
(1961 – 2000)   
                  (Dependent Variable:  π ∆ ) 
        
   OECD  US  UK  Germany 
   (Within)       
          
Constant   0.013  0.025  0.048  0.001 
     (0.095)*  (0.155)  (0.947) 
 21          
Lagged change of inflation -0.250  -0.008  -0.207  0.342 
   (0.002)  (0.980)  (0.806)  (0196) 
          
Unemployment -0.197  -0.389  -0.189 -0.0062 
   (0.000)  (0.095)  (0.626)  (0.964) 
          
Productivity gap  -0.048  -0.279  -0.097  -0.079 
   (0.202)  (0.397)  (0.300)  (0.598) 
          
Sacrifice Ratio*  5.08  2.571  5.29  161.29 
          
NARIU*   0.066  0.064  0.254  0.161 
          
Forecast error  1.09  2.17  3.88  -2.28 
(%)          
Standard deviation  1.33  1.56  3.40  1.20 
(%)          
Adjusted 
2 R    0.221  0.493  0.501  0.297 
* The number in parentheses is p value of F test for the hypothesis that the sum of coefficient of a 
variable is zero. 
* ) 1 ( / β C NAIRU − = ;  













Table 4   
 
Productivity Phillips Curve Model 





Dependent Variable:  Inflation ∆         
   OECD  US  UK  Germany 
 22 23
∆





*We only focus on the coefficient on 
* the number in parentheses is p value. 
Constant    *  * * * 
Lagged  inflation  *  * * * 
Unemployment    *  * * * 
θ  
 -0.159  -0.193  -1.176  0.009 
    (0.003)*  (0.126) (0.007) (0.889) 
        
2 ) ( − − t A θ
1 ) ( − − t A θ  
 0.083  -0.013  0.0853  -0.059 
    (0.096)  (0.943) (0.836) (0.445) 
        
 
  0.028  -0.074 0.994 -0.028 
    (0.580)  (0.623) (0.022) (0.676) 






















  OECD             US             UK    Germany 
 
       
(Within)  (Within)                          
                  With  Without   With  Without With Without With Without
                    
                     
                       
                  
Constant 0.011 0.014 0.018 0.021 0.043 0.013 -0.003 0.005
(0.086) (0.029) (0.254) (0.173) (0.751) (0.751)
Lagged  ∆ inflation 
 
-0.250                   
              
                  
              
                
                  
                       
                  
                 
                
                  
              
                  
                     
                  
              
% )                   
              
% )                   
-0.385 -0.126 -0.136 0.069 -0.236 0.354 0.241
(0.002)  (0.000)   (0.642)  (0.526) (0.853) (0.418) (0.161) (0.271)
    Unemployment  -0.120  -0.201    -0.286 -0.335 -0.184 -0.141 0.044 -0.061
(0.034)  (0.000)   (0.085)  (0.028) (0.670) (0.383) (0.752) (0.329)
      Productivity gap  -0.039  ****    -0.153  ****    -0.069  ****    -0.128  **** 
(0.253) (0.444) (0.536) (0.397)
     Change of import price  0.117  0.119 0.120 0.130 0.071 0.190 -0.006 -0.011
(0.000)  (0.000)   (0.016)  (0.004) (0.674) (0.120) (0.891) (0.759)
Sacrifice ratio  8.33  4.98    3.50 2.99 5.43 7.09 -22.73 16.39
NAIRU 0.092 0.070 0.063 0.063 0.234 0.092 0.068 0.082
    Forecast error  1.72  1.15    0.06 0.51 4.04 1.88 -2.49 -1.03
(
   Standard deviation  0.96  0.92    0.94 0.86 3.81 2.89 1.16 1.02
(
     Adjusted 
2 R   0.348                          0.014 0.805 0.820 0.403 0.380 0.372 0.419 Lagged ∆ inflation                       
                
                      
                      
               
                      
                        
                         
                      
              
                      
               
              
-0.238 -0.142 -0.543 -0.427 -0.299 -0.141 0.088 0.030
  (0.004)* (0.037)    (0.067)  (0.074) (0.424) (0.684) (0.767) (0.913)
Output  gap 0.266 0.260 0.688 0.707 0.338 0.423 0.381 0.430
  (0.000) (0.000)    (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.379) (0.258) (0.051) (0.017)
Productivity  gap -0.086 **** -0.386 **** -0.099 **** -0.028 ****
(0.010) (0.150) (0.159) (0.530)
Sacrifice ratio*    3.76  3.85    1.45 1.41 2.96 2.36 2.62 2.33
Forecast error    -0.14  0.12    0.31 1.18 -3.70 0.99 1.50 1.18
               (%)                         
 Standard deviation    1.27  1.28    1.27 1.20 3.55 3.34 0.97 0.92
               (%)                         
Adjusted 




Table 6. Output Gap Model With and Without  A − θ , 1961 – 1995, (Dependent Variable: π ∆ ) 
 
          OECD              US             UK       
      
Germany  
 
                  
 
        
(Within)                            
  With Without  With Without  With Without With Without
                      






L β β  is coefficient of output gap in model (7). 
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Figure 2. Constructed OECD Productivity Growth   
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Figure 6. Forecast of Inflation from Supply Shock Models 


























































































Figure 7. Forecast of Inflation from Potential Output Models 
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